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Demystifying phone unlocking tools: A technical overview

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SoC diagram showing Normal World and Secure World partitions, with the TEE running Trusted Applications and communicating with an optional Secure Element over SPI
SoC diagram showing Normal World and Secure World partitions, with the TEE running Trusted Applications and communicating with an optional Secure Element over SPI

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Boot flow diagram showing Boot ROM → Preloader → Trusted OS and Monitor (Secure World) / Bootloader → OS (Normal World), with the Secure Element running its own boot chain
Boot flow diagram showing Boot ROM → Preloader → Trusted OS and Monitor (Secure World) / Bootloader → OS (Normal World), with the Secure Element running its own boot chain

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BFU attack diagram on a device without a Secure Element: the attacker exploits the Boot ROM or enters recovery mode, compromises the preloader and Trusted OS, extracts the scrypt hash, and performs offline brute force of the PIN
BFU attack diagram on a device without a Secure Element: the attacker exploits the Boot ROM or enters recovery mode, compromises the preloader and Trusted OS, extracts the scrypt hash, and performs offline brute force of the PIN

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BFU attack diagram on a device with a Secure Element: the attacker can compromise the Boot ROM, preloader, and Trusted OS, but the Secure Element enforces rate-limited online brute force
BFU attack diagram on a device with a Secure Element: the attacker can compromise the Boot ROM, preloader, and Trusted OS, but the Secure Element enforces rate-limited online brute force

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USB attack surface diagram: an attacker connects a peripheral emulator to the USB controller, which reaches approximately 200 kernel drivers (MTP, MSC, HID, Audio, CVC, and others) behind the lock screen
USB attack surface diagram: an attacker connects a peripheral emulator to the USB controller, which reaches approximately 200 kernel drivers (MTP, MSC, HID, Audio, CVC, and others) behind the lock screen

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AFU attack flow: USB exploit achieves kernel code execution, bypassing the lock screen to access user processes and decrypted CE storage
AFU attack flow: USB exploit achieves kernel code execution, bypassing the lock screen to access user processes and decrypted CE storage

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